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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
- - - - - - - - - - - - -------
::~:JJAHIN AMADOR, 
Appellant, 
-vs -
Case No. 12059 
"!TARTMr,NT (~F E:MPLOYMSNT 
I Sf:CURITY L'lF THE ~~TA TE 
:)F UTAH, 
Respondent. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Department 
of Employment Security, denying appellant unemployment 
benefits and ordering appellant to repay $1,326.00 for 
: .1hich appellant was allegedly not legally elibible. 
I 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BELON 
By final decision dated March 18, 1970, the Board of 
,~eview affirmed the decision of the Appeals Referee 
i 
:ated January 6, 1970, denying appellant's claim for 
:nemployment benefits for certain weeks and ordering 
1 :ppellant to repay moneys received for said weeks in 
:he total amount of $1,326. 00. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the decision of the 
=s::i-s.rtrr.<::nt of Employment Security that appellant was 
:'lerpaid in the amount of $1,326.00, it being appellant's 
.~cntention that he was fully entitled to receive all of 
said amount. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
The facts are not in controversy. The only issue 
. is as to what facts are material and what legal con-
clusions are to be drawn from the facts. 
It is undisputed that for the weeks ending March 29, 
i April 12 through May 3, and May 17 through October 14, 
1
1969, appellant's wife signed his weekly claims 
I 
for benefits. (R. 31) It is also agreed that appellant 
received a total of $1,326.00 in benefits pursuant to 
,·said claims. (R. 33) It is true, as found by the 
I 
Referee, that the form upon which appellant's claims 
1 were submitted states: "THIS CLAIM MUST BE PERSONALLY 
I 
I 
3IGNED BY THE CLAIMANT." (R. 31) Admittedly, there was 
1 ''nothing physically or mentally that prevented the 
'laimant from signing his own weekly claim forms each 
1 
11eek during the period in question." (R. 32) 
-2-
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' 
On the other hand, there is nothing anywhere in 
the' l't"CC1rd te1 suggost that appellant was ever in any 
i.1'JY !1l1 tifi\.:'d tlMt his failure personally to sign his 
claims might result not only in denial of benefits 
~ut also in his being required to repay benefits 
for which he had not personally signed. 
There is nothing in the record to suggest that 
I appellant was not in fact fully entitled to unemployment 
benefits for each of the weeks in question. The Board 
, :if Review recognized the validity of that assertion 
rn its statement that "had these claims been filed by 
, tlK' \.:'laimant, this Board would have been constrained 
I t1' l't'mand the matter back to the Appeals Referee for 
the taking of additional testimony on the question of 
the availability of the claimant." (R. 6) 
On December 23, 1969, appellant and his wife 
appeared before the Referee and were examined by him, 
·mcter oath, extensively and without objection or 
:nterference by appellant's counsel who was present 
i 
I 3t the hearing. A reading of the 16 pages of testimony 
i rR. 14-30) makes abundantly clear that the weekly 
I 
· ~laims signed by appellant's wife were factually correct . 
I 
:md honestly made by her, and that Mrs. Amador had 
-3-
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:~en speaking the simple truth in an earlier written 
5t~tement taken from her by the Department on October 
"My husband, the above named, signed his 
claims for the week ending March 8, March 
15, March 22, and April 5, 1969. 
nAs his wife (Frances) I have signed all 
other claims for him. That is, I would 
complete the claim and sign his name to 
the card. 
nr really didn't think it mattered very 
much. He was in town all the time. I 
just started signing them all and that's 
all there was to it. 
nwe didn't intend any fraud by it. He 
was available for work all the time. He 
received and endorsed all the warrants." 
(R. 17 -18) 
At the outset of the hearing before the Referee 
on December 23, 1969, counsel appeared with appellant 
and clearly stated his legal position, inviting the 
1 Referee to examine appellant and his wife on the 
' merits: 
n(Mr. Young) Now if this were a case, and that 
is why Mr. Amador is here to answer 
questions about it, if this were 
a case where his failure to per-
sonally sign cards was related 
to a desire by him to avoid res-
ponsibility for statements which 
were made, then in such a case 
this regulation would be reasonable. 
I can see that it may serve a 
reasonable purpose, but we are 
saying -- applied to this particulart 
-4-
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"Referee 
"Mr. Young 
case where Mr. Amador has nothing 
to hide, and is here to testify, 
as well as his wife, under oath 
about the facts, the representation: 
that were made under his signature-
that in this situation, that the 
regulation is contrary to the 
purpose of the statute ••• And 
that is our legal position, and 
Mr. Amador is here to speak fully 
and frankly under oath about the 
circumstances during the period 
in question, and whether there is 
anything that might disqualify 
him from benefits. But we feel 
that the facts were accurately 
stated. The fact that Mrs. Amador 
admittedly signed his name on some 
of these cards during this period 
does not alter the question 
whether, on the facts, he was 
entitled to the benefits. 
Do you want to question Mr. Amador 
further on this point, or do you 
want me to proceed and get the 
information I would like? 
Perhaps if you would just go 
ahead." (R. 16) 
) 
The Referee's subsequent examination of appellant ) 
and his wife corroborated that appellant was eligible 
for benefits during the weeks his wife signed the 
claims: 
"Referee Now have those as a general rule, 
rather than putting it down for 
every time, as a general rule, 
those that you did sign on the 
weekly claims themselves, did you 
comolete the reverse side of them 
as to the information concerning 
availability and general informatio1 
about the claimant? 
c:: 
i 
d 
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.. Mrs. Amador Yes. 
"Referee Did you make a point of sitting 
down and talking with your husband 
concerning this matter, or is it 
just the fact that you as a general 
rule assumed you knew what your 
husband was doing when you complete( 
these? 
"Mrs. Amador Well, I knew what he was doing. 
I didn't have to question him. 
"Referee Some of these questions, for 
example, ask: 'I refused work, 
if yes explain below,' 'I failed 
to apply for work after being 
notified,' 'I was self-employed,' 
'I was attending school,' 'I travel-
ed away from home,' a question in 
regards to other benefits received, 
and 'I now have a steady job.' 
Those are the basic questions asked 
on the reverse side. Is that 
correct? 
11 Mrs. 7\mador Yes, that is right. 
"Referee And you felt that you had sufficient 
knowledge to answer these questions, 
is that what you are telling me? 
''Mrs. Amador Yes." (R. 19) 
"Referee 
"Mr. Amador 
"Referee 
You have been present during the 
testimony of your wife, is that 
correct? 
Yes, I have. 
You have had occasion to look at 
the claims that she was looking 
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"Mr. Amador 
"Referee 
"Mr. Amci.dor 
"Referee 
"Mr. Amador 
"Referee 
"Mr. Young 
TT Mr. J\nk1dor 
"Mr. Young 
"Mr. Amador 
"Mr. Young 
TT Mr. Amador 
at at the time, these weekly claims, 
at the time she was going through 
them, is that correct? 
Yes. 
Is there anything in her testimony 
that you do not agree with? 
No, there isn't. 
To your knowledge, what she has 
testified to would be correct then? 
Yes. 
Mr. Young, would you like to pursue 
any further in regards to a couple 
of statements made in your appeal? 
Yes. Mr. Amador, did you--were you 
aware that your wife was making out 
these claim cards each week when 
she did so? Were you aware that 
she was? 
Yes, I was. 
All right. And were you--was this 
with your consent? 
Yes, it was." (R. 23) 
Mr. Amador, to the best your know-
ledge, were the factual statements 
that your wife signed to on these 
cards correct? Did she state the 
correct facts? And if you are not 
sure, would you like to look at 
the cards? 
No, she put the right facts. 
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"Mr. Young 
TT Mr• Amador 
nMr. Young 
11 Mr. Amador 
''Mr. Young 
nMr. Amador 
TT Mr. Young 
"Mr. Amador 
Did she know your employment 
situation and whether or not 
you were working'? 
Oh, yes. 
She was living with you all this 
time? 
I hope she was. 
Do you feel she was acting on your 
behalf when she did this? 
Yes, uh-huh. 
To your knowledge~ 
Yes. 11 (R. 24) 
Following the foregoing examination of appellant 
and his wife, the Referee separated the witnesses (R. 11) 
and examined each with the other excluded from the room. 
Similar questions were asked about their backgrounds 
and activities. The Referee picked up a discrepancy 
with regard to a very recent job opportunity (which was 
~relevant to any of the weekly claims here in dispute) 
Which appellant had not mentioned but his wife recalled. 
TT Referee • . . Mr. Amador, for your infor-
mation, I have been asking your wife 
very similar questions to those I 
asked you while you were in here, 
the employers you contacted, and 
what she recalls concerning this. 
For your infonnation, she might 
happen to make a statement on it, 
she indicated that you had contacted 
Central City to her knowledge 
several times during the past month. 
-8-
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n Mr. Amador 
"R"'.::feree 
Does this recall to your mind that 
that was possibly so? 
Yes, uh-huh. 
Is there any reason why you didn't 
refer that to me at the time, 
because I asked you the same 
question? 
TTMr. Amador Well, at the time, I mean it--does 
this have anything to do with this 
here decision? 
"R~=>ferec Yes. For the record, what I am 
trying to find out, see, you told 
me, or said in effect, that your 
wife knows what you are doing, 
and that she is able to complete 
these forms each week. 
"Mr. Amador Oh, yes, she is more informed about 
it than I am, as far as that goes. 
"Referee 
I guess the last time I talked to 
them was just about four or five 
days ago, about a week ago I was 
talking to them seeing about workin~ 
down there. Down at Central City 
there is a director down there, you 
know. It would be just part time, 
of course. It would be at night, 
taking care of the place. 
I have no further questions. 
(R. 2 9) 
. . . " 
We might add that Mr. Amador's statement about his 
1vife being better informed than he was is understandable, 
in view of the fact that she was a B student in school 
(R. 15) whereas Mr. Amador was unable to do satisfactory 
Work beyond the sixth grade level but was given passing 
-9-
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grades to keep him eligible for athletics until he 
dropped out in the eleventh grade at West High. (R. 20-
21) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEPARTMENTTS DECISION ERRONEOUSLY INTER-
PRETS UCA 35-4-6(d) AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRARY 
TC~ Tiff PURPOSE OF THE WORJ<MANT S COMPENSATION 
l\C' T. 
The Department's decision in this case presents a 
simple question of law: Assuming that a claimant for 
workman Ts compensation was otherwise entitled to unem-
ployment benefits and was paid such benefits, may he 
be required to repay the state for such benefits if it 
appears that he did not personally sign his claim form 
pursuant to a statement on the form saying only: "THIS 
\'LAIM MUST BE PERSONALLY SIGNED BY THE CLAIMANTn? 
First of all, it should be noted that the form says 
nothing about the possible consequences of having an 
agent sign the form for the claimant. (See copies of 
form at R. 42.) The form does inform the claimant that 
''the law provides penalties for false statements." (R. 42 
~owever, there is no serious suggestion anywhere in the 
record that appellant or his wife made any false state-
ment of fact which might be relevant or material to the 
-10-
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r1Y1p1...'r d1.'tcrmin,1tion of his eligibility for unemploy-
ment benefits. The record is devoid of any facts which 
might controvert the sworn testimony of appellant and 
his wife that he was in fact eligible for all of the 
benefits received. 
There is nothing in the language of UCA 35-4-6(d) 
to suggest a legislative intent to deprive an unemployed 
man of benefits retroactively on the ground that he 
didnTt follow all of the instructions on an application 
T1...1 the contrary, TT This court has repeatedly held 
that the Workmen's Compensation Act should be liberally 
construed to effectuate its purposes, and where there is 
doubt, it should be resolved in favor of coverage of 
the employee. TT Jones v. California Packing Corp., 
121 Utah 612, 615, 244 P.2d 640 (1952). 
The purposes of the Act have been authoritatively 
stated by this court in the leading case of Singer 
~wing Machine Co. v. Industrial Commission. 
104 Utah 175, 134 P.2d 479 (1943): 
"(a) The Unemployment Compensation Law 
was enacted under and as an exercise of the 
police power of the state. 
-11-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
!! (b) Its purpose is remedial to pro-
tect the health, morals, and welfare of 
the people by providing a cushion against 
the shocks and rigors of unemployment. 
TT (c) Being remedial under the police 
power and not imposing limitations on 
basic rights, it should be liberally 
construed.TT 
104 Utah at 18 9. 
Rather than resolving doubts in favor of the 
unemployed claimant or ''providing a cushion against 
the shocks and rigors of unemployment, TT the Department 
h,:is sei:=ed upon a technicality of its own devising to 
,Jcny appellant benefits to which he was clearly entitled. 
\vt~ believe the Department's position is diametrically 
opposed to the purposes of the Workman's Compensation 
Act as interpreted repeatedly by this court. 
POINT II 
THE DEPARTMENT'S DECISION IS SO ARBITRARY 
AND UNREASONABLE AS TO CONSTITUTE A DENIAL 
OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
The state has suffered no pecuniary loss which can 
be rationally related to appellant's failure personally 
to sign his weekly claims. There is no question but 
that appellant was entitled to the benefits paid to 
him; the record establishes that the claims signed by 
his wife were factual and correct. Appellant and his 
-12-
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wife intended no fraud upon the state, and in fact no 
fraud occurred. Yet the Department takes the position 
that because appellant permitted his wife to sign the 
claim forms, appellant (who at the time of the hearings 
was still unemployed) must repay more than $1,300.00 to 
the state. 
We have not as yet been cited a regulation which 
supports the n0partment' s position. The closest thing 
t,) Slh.'h ,l regulation is the statement on the claim form 
which says: "THIS CLAIM MUST BE PERSONALLY SIGNED BY 
THE CLAIMANT." (R. 42) The form does not go on to 
explain the consequences of noncompliance with that 
statement, any more than it says what will happen if 
the claimant disregards similar statements that he is 
to sign TT In ink" or that he must TT NOT WRITE IN THIS 
SPACE. n (See R. 42. ) 
We do not question the utility or reasonableness 
of each of the instructions on the claims form. They 
undoubtedly serve useful functions in the processing 
of claims. The question is whether innocent noncom-
pliance with certain instructions justifies the 
Department in pursuing such a harsh, punitive course 
of action against appellant. We believe that the 
-13-
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';e:partmentr s position in this case is unauthorized by 
:t~tute and is so arbitrary and capricious as to 
,;onsti tute a denial of due process of law under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
3nd under Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah State Con-
sti tu ti on. 
CONCLUSION 
The decisions of the Board of Review and of the 
Appeals referee should be reversed with instructions 
to reinstate appellant's benefits for the weeks ending 
March 29, April 12 through May 3, and May 17 through 
October 4, 1969, representating a total amount of 
$1,326.00. 
-14-
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD L. YOONG 
College of Law 
University of Utah 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112 
Attorney for Appellant 
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